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OBSCENITY LAWS-A SHIFT TO
REALITY?
Earl Warren, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
In a World which is a massive crucible of questioning and
change, where critical issues of poverty and war and disease and
discrimination scream for solution, it is a peculiar phenomenon that
the laws relating to obscenity have suddenly jumped into sharp focus
in the eyes of both the public and the legal profession. Having lain
relatively dormant and accepted for many years, they now strangely
command attention of an unusually intense, and even violent, nature.
The emotional basis for this reaction may be obscure to those
resilient few who adjust to change readily or who have early in life
adopted a live-and-let-live philosophy. But to the great majority of
others, who have been taught that proper conduct is largely governed
by a certain number of "absolutes," the battle is very real. To such
people, transgressions against what they believe to be the old norms
are likely to seem to be a direct assault upon the entire structure of
traditionally accepted forms of human behavior. Apparently, the
public emphasis on sexual themes in recent years falls squarely into
this category.
THE MERGER OF ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL LAW
From a legal standpoint, the fundamental reason for the tension
lies in the peculiar merging long ago of two distinct bodies of law
-ecclesiastical law and the bodies of laws made by governments to
regulate their everyday affairs. Therefore, any discussion of the legal
aspects of obscenity must logically begin with an awareness of this
fact.
In the days when religious bodies governed the citizens of a
region just as much as did the civil authorities, the civil laws were
mainly concerned with regulating conduct only as necessary to pre-
* B.S., University of California, Davis, 1952; J.D., Boalt Hall, University of
California, Berkeley, 1960; Member California Bar and Federal Bar; Judge, Municipal
Court, Sacramento Municipal Court District; Lecturer, Sacramento State College
1963-65; Deputy Director, Chile-California Program (AID) 1963-64; Member,
California State Board of Control 1965-66; Former Commissioner, Sacramento City
Planning Commission; Former Member, Governor's Advisory Board on Mental
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serve reasonable order in the society-while matters relating strictly
to morality were left to the workings of ecclesiastical law. However,
as the civil governments became more powerful and the political
control of the churches waned, the civil law gradually absorbed
many of the ecclesiastical laws.' In doing so, these religion based
laws generally took on a revised nature so as to conform to the
enforcement patterns for the civil laws. Hence, a religious law which
perhaps called only for "atonement" or "confession" when broken
in the ecclesiastical sphere, usually carried a penalty of jail, fine,
forfeiture, or worse when it became part of the civil law.'
Unfortunately, in the years since these mergers took place, the
members of the legal profession, as well as governments and their
citizens, have increasingly come to forget the derivation of the two
bodies of laws and the distinctions between them which were once so
important. Thus there has been a distinct trend to think of conduct
as being legal or illegal instead of in terms of being moral or immoral.
Today, however, when nearly all traditional values and customs
are being tested to see whether they are founded in logic and humani-
tarianism or only in special interest, the earlier distinctions are being
consciously or unconsciously bared. And many citizens are insisting
that civil laws return to the status of being those which secure an
orderly, free and just society, leaving matters of an otherwise per-
sonal nature to the desires of the individual and the dictates of his
God. Among these citizens are a great number of men of the cloth.
From a practical standpoint, this is difficult to accomplish com-
pletely, for there is an unavoidable amount of essential overlapping
of the two concepts. And from a human nature standpoint, history
indicates that it is virtually impossible-because men and their
governments will invariably attempt, to some extent at least, to im-
pose their personal views on others by mandatory compliance with
certain civil laws. It is thus an age-old battle. A battle between those
who believe in influencing by intellectual persuasion and those who
believe in achieving conformity by governmental fiat.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Those of us living in the United States have a rare means of
challenging both our laws and public attitudes-a means which in
1 Henkin, Morals and the Constitution, 63 COLum. L. REv. 391 (1963); G.
MUELLER, CRME, LAW, AND THE SCHOLARS 1-30 (1969).
2 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW 2234-39 (11th ed. 1912); 2 STEPHEN, A HISTORY
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
(1769).
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some cases amounts to a mandate. This is the First Amendment's
provisions for freedom of speech. As the cornerstone of any discus-
sion involving the rights of an individual to express his ideas to
others, and receive the thoughts of others, it provides that:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to as-
semble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
3
Although the reference is only to "speech," this was early
recognized to include non-verbal conduct which serves as a means
of expression,4 and there is no apparent vestige of challenge to that
proposition today. Hence writings, photographs, movies, paintings,
statuary, bodily gestures, and other symbolic conduct are all recog-
nized as being within the purview of its intended scope.,
However, it is equally clear that the courts have consistently
held that obscenity is not, and never has been protected by the
mantle of the First Amendment.' And it is here that the controversy
really begins to swirl, for not only does the Civil Law vs. Ecclesiasti-
cal Law concept come sharply into play, the efficacy of the First
Amendment itself is seriously challenged by how narrowly or broadly
the term "obscene" is defined.
If some of the usual dictionary definitions of obscenity were
applied (e.g. "disgusting to the senses," "grossly repugnant to the
generally accepted notions of what is appropriate") it is obvious
that the hallowed free speech provisions of the Constitution would
be of little moment, for, in that case, only "generally accepted"
ideas would be protected. Particularly onerous is the fact that this
would apply to expressions of a religious or political nature as well
as to other types of expression. Fortunately, the First Amendment
has always been interpreted as obviously carrying more potency than
thisT Nevertheless, the laws relating to obscenity rocked along for
many years without clear definition (often referring to accounts of
such things as "bloodshed" and "crime") 8 until in the landmark
case of Roth v. United States,' the scope at last narrowed to matters
of a sexual nature and an attempt was made to spell out how it
3 U.S. CoNsr. amend. I.
4 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
5 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500-05'(1952); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).6 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736-37 (1877); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 481, 485 (1957).7 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252 (1941); cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
8 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
9 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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should be determined if something was "obscene" in the eyes of the
Constitution.'
Through this ruling, the Court hoped to provide a means of
giving viability to reasonable laws relating to the problem, yet
preclude them from unduly encroaching upon the sacred ground of
the First Amendment. The Court was not unmindful of the public's
"hangups" on such matters, and the general desire of the citizenry
to keep unsolicited exposure to salacious themes at a minimum."
Yet it was also well aware of numerous past absurdities which are
well illustrated by the notation in a later case 2 that the City of
Chicago once censored a Walt Disney movie merely because it
showed the birth of a buffalo calf!
THE ROTH FORMULA
Roth set forth a formula-a formula which was an earnest and
thoughtful attempt to give guidelines in a highly confused and
politically sensitive area. But it is equally apparent that the ruling
was not to be a panacea-only the best that the Court could do at
that time. Justices Black and Douglas dissented, 3 Justice Harlan
concurred in the result in one issue and dissented in another, 4 and
10 "The early leading standard of obscenity allowed material to be judged
merely by the effect of an isolated exerpt upon particularly susceptible persons.
Regina v. Hicklin, (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 360. Some American courts adopted this
standard but later decisions have rejected it and substituted this test: whether to
the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests." Roth v. United
States, supra note 9, at 488-89.
11 "But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of
obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. This rejection for that
reason is mirrored in the universal judgment that obscenity should be restrained,
reflected in the international agreement of over 50 nations, in the obscenity laws
of all of the 48 states, and in the 20 obscenity laws enacted by the Congress from
1842 to 1956." (See also the concurring opinion of the Chief Justice at 495, and the
separate opinion of Justice Harlan at S01-02.) Roth v. United States, supra note
9, at 484-85.
12 Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 69 (1961).
Is Justices Black and Douglas felt that "[wihen we sustain these convictions,
we make the legality of a publication turn on the purity of thought which a book
or tract instills in the mind of the reader. I do not think we can approve that
standard and be faithful to the command of the First Amendment . . . . By these
standards, punishment is inflicted for thoughts provoked, not for overt acts nor anti-
social conduct." Roth v. United States, supra note 9, at 508-09.
14 Justice Harlan stated, "[My basic difficulties with the Court's opinion are
threefold. First, the opinion paints with such a broad brush that I fear it may
result in a loosening of the tight reins which state and federal courts should hold
upon the enforcement of obscenity statutes. Second, the Court fails to discriminate
between the different factors which, in my opinion, are involved in the constitutional
adjudication of state and federal obscenity cases. Third, relevant distinctions be-
tween the two obscenity statutes here involved, and the Court's own-definition of
'obscenity' are ignored." Id. at 496.
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Chief Justice Warren concurred in the results but wanted them
limited to the specific facts involved. Thus, although Roth became
law, it did so with no great enthusiasm by the Court, for not only
did it present a wide variety of differing views, subsequent cases
15
were to disclose that even those in the majority did not share exactly
the same opinions as to what the majority opinion appeared to say.
Nevertheless, Roth has been the foundation for all proceedings
since its rendition, and therefore must be the starting point in
analyzing where the law stands now. And its "formula" is still
mandatory, although how it is to be practically applied, even in the
simplest of cases, remains substantially in doubt these thirteen years
since its pronouncement.
Justice Brennan, the author of the majority opinion in Roth,
clearly restated the formula in Memoirs v. Massachusetts."8
We defined obscenity in Roth in the following terms: '[W]hether
to the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a
prurient interest.' Under this definition, as elaborated in subsequent
cases, three elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a)
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a
prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because
it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the descrip-
tion or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is
utterly without redeeming social value.' 7
A. Prurient Interest
In the first element, which is that the dominant theme of the
material must appeal to a prurient interest in sex, the first real
obstacle of workability is encountered in the word, "prurient." The
California Legislature has construed it as meaning "shameful" or
"morbid"' 8 and although this is probably a conceptually accurate
approach, both constructions raise problems of interpretation and
courtroom application which are typical of all of the definitions thus
far put on the word.
"Shameful," for instance, has two distinct meanings, one of
which is that the act is repugnant to the observer, while the other
means that the act arouses a feeling of shame in the actor. "Morbid"
has even more definite pathological foundations inasmuch as its best
15 Note Justice Clark's concurrence in the Chief Justice's dissent in Jacobelis
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964). Compare the majority opinion in Roth, supra
note 9, with the majority opinion in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
16 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
17 Id. at 418 (citation to Roth omitted).
IS CAL. PEN. CODE § 311(a) (West 1970).
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known synonym is "unhealthy," and it is equated with "disease" in
both medical and common parlance.
Hence at least two of these three meanings have medical
overtones, and defense lawyers can legitimately seize upon this to
insist that the prosecuting attorney must present expert medical
testimony on the subject as a part of his prima facie case. Of course,
this is a great burden on the prosecution, often an impossible one,
and accordingly is usually rejected by the trial judge. But the de-
fense can claim that surely the Court had something in mind other
than merely whether or not the observer was shocked by what he
saw.
Proceeding further into the area of practical application, we
run into the word, "interest"-or more properly the phrase "a
prurient interest." Who has such an interest? All of us? Or only
certain deviant types? Does a homosexual act in front of a strictly
heterosexual audience "appeal to a prurient interest"? Or is it non-
appealing? Are we attempting to penalize actions which excite
lustful inclinations, or are we attempting to penalize actions which
instead create revulsion? Both? The answer is less clear now than it
was prior to Roth.
We must also determine who that person is who must make
the judgment as to whether there is such an appeal. We are told that
it is the "average person."'" Not just the young, or just the old, orjust the sophisticated, or just the naive-but all of these and a lot
more. Sort of a composite type person. Does such a human exist?
Or are we merely falling back on one of those legal escape valves
we sometimes manufacture in order to avoid reality? It is one thing
to say that the "average man," by his nature, will take reasonable
care for his safety, and that he will normally use good business
practices and otherwise conduct himself in a certain manner in
certain situations. But can we honestly expect a handful of people
on a jury to know whether or not certain actions will appeal to a
prurient interest of unspecified persons of unspecified ages, sexes
and cultural and religious backgrounds?
And how, under this mandate, do we treat the wide variety of
situations which obviously create completely differing results? For
instance, a nude in a nudist colony has a different impact on his
observers than does a nude walking the mainstreet of town,
yet the formula seems to say that we must nevertheless think of the
effect on the same average man in each instance without considera-
tion as to where the conduct occurs.
19 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489-90 (1956); Memoirs. v. Massachu-
setts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
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At this point, it might be wise to pause and consider whether
all this is merely nit-picking. These things are not, of course, merely
pulled out of the sky to carp at, for they are issues trial attorneys
and trial court judges must wrestle with on a very real day-to-day
basis.
"But, after all," we might say (as so many do) "if something
is bad, it's bad, and we shouldn't have to worry about such niceties."
Or should we? If we were the board of censorship which was squea-
mish about the Disney movie, the Supreme Court would not think
much of us for simply following our gut reaction. And it would be
naive to assume that such learned justices agonizing over such a
difficult problem would not try to say what they mean.
Naturally, the Court intended that we use our common sense
in applying the formula. But "common sense" alone has not solved
its inherent dilemmas. Justice Stewart delighted everyone when he
said he could not define hard-core pornography, but he knew it when
he saw it.2" However, at the enforcement level we are not permitted
the luxury of this approach, for the Court obviously would not
evaluate the Disney movie in the same way as the Chicago censors
did, and the records are replete with cases where the substitution
of personal leanings for constitutional requirements at the trial
level has resulted in convictions and reversals with all their trau-
matic consequences."
Hence it is patently apparent that those who deal in the enforce-
ment of obscenity laws must diligently attempt to ascertain not
only the true ingredients in a formula such as that of Roth, but
their respective dosages.
B. Community Standards
Assuming then that we somehow get by the first element in the
formula, we must next determine if "the material is patently offen-
sive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating
to the description or representation of sexual matters."22 This has
generally been interpreted to mean that the act or material must go
"substantially beyond" existing community standards of "candor"
for that type of representation.2
Immediately, we are faced with the problem of what is meant
by the "community," and here we run into a fiction which is almost
20 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
21 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495 (1952) ; Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952).
22 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489. (1956) .. ..
23 In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 572, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655, 661-62 (1968).
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as perplexing as that of the mythical "average man." For it is not
the immediate community which most people think of-namely,
their town and its environs-but probably at least the entire state,
24
and it may even be much larger than that.2
5
Little quarrel can be made with the proposition that it would be
wrong to allow a certain community to unreasonably label as crimi-
nal certain conduct which is proper elsewhere. But neither is it
reasonable to expect sheltered communities to readily adapt to the
more bizarre conduct of the "wide-open" communities.
And when a huge state like California is involved-where there
are the most rural of communities and the most cosmopolitan, and
every conceivable degree of sophistication in between-the task of
determining a statewide standard is one of incredible magnitude and
highly doubtful potential success. The same, of course, would also
be true of a national standard.
Beyond that, we have a problem as to whether we are talking
about a standard which relates to what takes place within the
physical borders of the community, or whether we are really talking
about an environmental community-namely what the people within
the community are exposed to.
In many places, a very straight-laced city in State A lies
adjacent to a very libertarian city in State B, and the citizens in each
city are just as much exposed to the goings on in the other city as
they are to those of their own. Therefore, it is legitimate to ask if it
serves the constitutional mandates, in this age of great mobility, to
rely on the tenuous environmental importance of historical lines of
political demarcation.
Going deeper into the thicket, we run into the phrase "standards
of candor," and must ask if we are talking about what "exists," or
only what is "accepted"? Certainly it is not in keeping with our
American way of life to suppress a form of otherwise legitimate
expression merely because it is looked unfavorably upon by the
majority. Yet simply because something undesirable has negligently
been allowed to exist is not reason to give it sanction. So again we
are faced with a requirement which, no matter how interpreted, does
not accurately take into account the various cultures, conditions and
attitudes which are present in any specified inhabited area.
As a last ingredient of this second part of the formula, we note
that the complained of conduct must go "substantially beyond" the
24 Id. at 577, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
25 See the diverse opinions in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192-94, 200
(1964).
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existing standards.26 While this is an understandable attempt to give
further protection to the constitutional freedom of thought and
expression, it does suggest that the boundaries of obscenity can be
nibbled away by going "a little beyond" but not "substantially
beyond." It suggests that the standards will gradually become more
and more relaxed, regardless of the fact that there may come a point
at which the welfare of the entire system will be seriously jeopardized
by further inroads.
C. Redeeming Social Value
Finally (assuming that we successfully traverse the mazes of
the first two elements) we come to the no-man's land of the require-
ment that the conduct or material must be "utterly without redeem-
ing social value.127
The first curious thing we note about this point is that it violates
the general rule that the prosecution must prove every element of
the offense in order to present a prima facie case.28 For, of course,
it would be patently absurd to require the prosecuting attorney to
speculate in this regard by even beginning to attempt to prove that
the matter or conduct is totally devoid of any value.
While this procedural quirk is perhaps really not too bother-
some, we do face a problem of fantastic latitude in interpretation and
application, for the term "social value" is terribly imprecise and
carries different meanings to different people. The usual response
tends, in human nature, to be an emotional one-namely that if a
person is sufficiently offended by what he has observed, he is not
likely to be willing to see any value in it even if considerable value
truly exists. And yet, we are told that, no matter how overwhelming
the damning evidence is on the first two elements, such evidence
cannot overrule the effect of existing social value. If value exists,
the matter is automatically not obscene.29
Although court decisions following Roth3 0 have virtually erased
any viability to the word "redeeming," it strangely remains in the
formula and in the instructions the judge must give the jury. And the
issue is also very unclear as to how far the trial judge must go in
making an independent determination of the existence of social
value."
28 In re Giannini, supra note 22 at 572, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
27 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
28 1 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES §§ 88, 90 (1963).
29 Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1963).
30 Id. at 920, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 812-13.
31 See Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 1158, at 1190-91 (1966).
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The concept additionally snags upon the question of "social
value to who?" This is frequently raised when psychiatrists testify
that exposure to pornography is helpful in the treatment of certain
patients, thereby implying that obscenity intrinsically has some
social value. Is this enough to give protection to materials which
have no such value to the rest of the population? If not, how large
must the benefitted group be before the material or conduct be-
comes constitutionally acceptable?
THE UNWORKABILITY OF THE PRESENT APPROACH
All these questions about the formula remain essentially unan-
swered. Naturally, individual defense attorneys, prosecutors, police-
men and judges have personal opinions as to what some of the
answers should be, but there is nothing approaching unanimity on
any point, and a well-handled case is likely to bring most of them
into serious dispute.
The legal result is that cases of alleged obscenity are extremely
difficult to prosecute, to defend, and to preside over, and the cost
to the taxpayers is huge. With this goes a disproportionate amount
of publicity, a rising of public frustration, and, not infrequently,
attempts by legislative bodies to meet the problem by enacting
repressive and constitutionally defective laws. 2 In short, it is his-
torically apparent that the formula falls far short of providing a
workable solution to the problem of handling what we now term
obscenity.
These failings are not pointed out by way of criticizing the
thoughtful efforts of the courts to define what is obscene, for the
formula is probably as good a one as could be devised for this pur-
pose. But they are noted by way of illustrating the unworkability
of this overall approach to the problem, and by way of suggesting
that another approach is both desirable and necessary.
A DIFFERENT APPROACH
The correct tack is simply to abandon the concept of labeling
any particular act or material as inherently obscene, and instead
determine whether it is actionable within the context of how it is
employed. It is not a new concept-just one we seem too timid to
fully adopt.
It would far better protect the constitutional principles we
82 Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 69 (1961) (dissenting opinion by
Warren, C.J., joined in by Black, Douglas, and Brennan, J.J.).
[Vol. I11
OBSCENITY LAWS
operate upon, and yet at the same time give more effective protec-
tion against those unwarranted activities which so disturb the citi-
zenry. And it would additionally help alleviate the dilemma created
by the question as to what extent a government may go in attempt-
ing to legislate the morals of its subjects.
Happily, the concept also squares with the natural inclina-
tions of human nature, and is consistent with what governments and
their citizens actually do in the everyday conduct of their affairs.
For example, nudity on a public street is taboo, yet we tolerate it in
nudist camps. Naked models and racy plays are old hat in college
classes, yet we don't allow them in grammar schools. The "dirty
joke" may be commonplace in meetings of men's clubs, but distinctly
out of line in mixed meetings. A book like the Kinsey Report would
certainly never be labeled as pornographic today, yet if pandered to
young children, it would raise the ire of most everyone.
The list could go on and on, hypocrisy after hypocrisy. Not
hypocrisy within the context of human nature, but hypocrisy within
present legal concepts. For, in the logical application of putting labels
on matter as such, if that naked model in the college art class does
not offend the fictional "average man" in that fictional "community,"
then he or she does nothing "obscene" by sitting in the grammar
school art class. And, conversely, if the off-color joke is offensive to
the mixed group, then it is legally wrong for mature males to tell it
to each other.
No approach to the problem will be totally effective or as ef-
ficient as we would wish-and, in fact, some of the concepts and
problems of Roth must necessarily be included. But it should be
remembered that there are existing laws governing human conduct
which we have lived gracefully with for many, many years, and
which, if amplified a bit and applied to this problem, could far better
accomplish what we need to achieve in the regulation of obscenity
than do the laws we are now using for this purpose.
Nuisance
We have, for instance, the laws of "nuisance," which, though
often cumbersome in application, have considerable potential for
meeting many of the problem areas in a realistic manner."3 Such laws
give maximum leeway in the area of personal conduct, but at the
same time provide the means of abating that conduct if it goes
beyond what is legally permissible.
33 For an excellent treatment, see Comment, Obscenity: The Pig in the Parlor,
10 SANTA CLARA LAW. 288 (1970).
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The opponents of this approach can rightly claim that it is
very difficult to enjoin threatened offensive activity, and that by
the time the conduct is stopped, the "damage" is often done. Also
that there usually isn't a workable "penalty" which attaches so as to
prevent further such activity.
But it must be conceded that it is a unique area of the law from
the standpoint of procedural fairness and from the standpoint of the
fact that the issues are usually tried in very close proximity in time
to the inception of the complained of conduct. Also, it cannot be
denied that, more than any other established procedure, the laws of
nuisance faithfully adhere to the constitutional abhorrence of "prior
restraints" of freedom of expression.
Disturbing the Peace
There is also a very intriguing possibility in those quaint old
laws which are generally classified in the category of "disturbing the
peace." Although rather imprecise, somewhat vague, and usually
archaic in language, they have flourished in every community since
the inception of the Nation because of a need for them, and because
they peculiarly recognize the vagaries of human nature.
In legal analysis, there is often little to recommend them, yet
they have constantly proven their worth and therefore probably
represent an important phase of "natural law." Since it is this very
element which is now lacking in our approach to obscenity, and since
somehow these half-forgotten laws once did a pretty fair job of
regulating lewd conduct, they ought to be looked at again from a
conceptual standpoint.
California provides that:
Every person who maliciously and wilfully disturbs the peace or quiet
of any neighborhood or person, by loud or . . . tumultuous or offen-
sive conduct . . . or uses any vulgar, profane or indecent language
within the presence or hearing of women or children ... is guilty of a
misdemeanor .... 34
Like all such laws, it is imperfect, leaving ambiguities in defini-
tion and scope. But it nevertheless very firmly puts the spotlight on
conduct and willfulness, and upon the effect the conduct actually
achieves or is likely to achieve. And when compared with more
modern legislative attempts to meet the problem, it looks very good
indeed.
For example, nudity in California is now largely penalized by
84 CAr. PEN. CODE § 415 (West 1970).
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a re-enacted "disorderly conduct" law3 and by a revised "indecent
exposure" law.86 Conviction under either statute requires subsequent
registration as a sex offender.37
Hence, it is disorderly conduct to engage in ... lewd or dis-
solute conduct in any public place or in any place open to the
public or exposed to public view."38 There is no consideration as to
whether there are observers, or likely to be observers, of the conduct
involved-just the question (1) whether the conduct is "lustful,"
"lascivious," "immoral" or "wanton1 39 and (2) whether it takes
place in a "public place."
What if the conduct occurred in the center of a deserted national
forest? What about the young couple that parks at the end of a
deserted country road and engages in sex play?
The same concern is even more applicable to the first part of
the indecent exposure statute which condemns anyone who "[e]x-
poses his person, or the private parts thereof, in any public place.
*...Y4o With not even a requirement of lewdness, how do we view a
troop of Boy Scouts innocently skinny-dipping in a lake in the
center of that remote forest?
The exposure statute goes on to add another catch-all provision:
... or exposes his person in any place where there are present other
persons to be offended or annoyed thereby. ,, . What if someone
(as many do) goes to a theater expecting to be "offended"? And isn't
there a great distinction between a person being "annoyed" or even
"offended" and involuntarily having his "peace" disturbed?
Assault and Battery
Another possibility is to expand the concepts of assault and
battery. California defines a criminal assault as ". . . an unlawful
attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury
on the person of another142 and a battery as ". . . any willful and
unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.1
4
These definitions do not substantially vary from the patterns which
exist in a rather universal form throughout the world.
85 Id. § 647.
86 Id. § 314.
87 Id. § 290.
38 Id. § 647(a).
89 People v. Babb, 103 Cal. App. 2d 326, 229 P.2d 843 (191).
40 CAL. PEN. CODE § 314(l) (West 1970).
41 Id.
42 Id. § 240.
48 Id. § 242.
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Again, these are well-tested laws of exceptionally long-standing
application" which have successfully dealt with man's unfortunate
tendency to frequently use unjustified physical violence on his
neighbors. If extended so as to adequately encompass assaults of a
visual and audible nature, as has been done in the case of civil
assaults and batteries,45 these laws could well help fill one of the
greatest gaps now existing in the obscenity field-namely, the need
to protect people from being unconscionably preyed upon by those
who deal in sex themes.
Thus it could be actionable, as a battery, if a patron of a theater
or tavern was not warned of the heavy sex theme of the entertain-
ment inside before he entered. And it could be actionable to sell the
Kinsey Report to young children, or otherwise assault a nonconsent-
ing person with a sex theme going beyond what is normally tolerated
and expected in such situations."
44 3 BLACKSTONE, COmMENTARIES *120; 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *216;
2 BURDICK, LAW OF CRIME § 338 (1946).
45 R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 107 (2d ed. 1969); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
32-52 (3d ed. 1964); 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965); South-
eastern Greyhound Corp. v. Graham, 69 Ga. App. 621, 26 S.E.2d 371 (1943); Ft.
Worth & R.G. Ry. v. Bryant, 210 S.W. 556 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918); Birmingham Ry.,
Light and Power Co. v. Glenn, 179 Ala. 263, 60 So. 111 (1912).
46 In Williams v. District of Columbia, 419 F.2d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1969), there
was an interesting joinder of the three concepts (nuisance, breach of peace, and
assault). The defendant had been convicted under a statute which made it un-
lawful to use "profane language" or "indecent and obscene words" in a public
place. The question before the appellate court was whether the statute was con-
stitutional, and to this the Court replied:
That portion of [22 D.C. Code § 1107 (1967)] which makes it illegal for
any person "to curse, swear, or make use of any profane language or in-
decent or obscene words" is on its face extraordinarily broad, so broad in
fact that it would allow punishment of the hapless stonemason who, after
crushing his toe, innocently utters a few relieving expletives within ear-
shot of a public place ...
Both the facts of Chaplinsky [v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)]
itself and the cases which followed it, indicate that the circumstances
under which words are spoken are of critical importance in deciding
whether the Constitution permits punishment to be imposed. Apart from
punishing profane or obscene words which are spoken in circumstances
which create a threat of violence, the state may also have a legitimate in-
terest in stopping one person from "inflict[ing] injury" on others by ver-
bally assaulting them with language which is grossly offensive because of
its profane or obscene character. The fact that a person may constitution-
ally indulge his taste for obscenities in private does not mean that he is
free to intrude them upon the attentions of others. . . We therefore con-
clude that Section 1107 would not be invalid if the statutory prohibition
against profane or obscene language in public were interpreted to require
an additional element that the language be spoken in circumstances which
threaten a breach of the peace. And for these purposes a breach of the
peace is threatened either because the language creates a substantial risk
of provoking violence, or because it is, under "contemporary community
standards" so grossly offensive to members of the public who actually
overhear it as to amount to a nuisance. Id. at 644-46.
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Adoption of these concepts would basically allow mature, con-
senting adults to expose themselves, if they so desired, to matters
now considered obscene, but would far better protect them from sex
themes they would not want to be exposed to. It would give a free-
dom of choice which is not now present because of the constant
uninvited deluge of such themes in the mails, periodicals, theaters,
stores, and nearly every facility and media utilized by the public.
Those who desired to disseminate a sexual theme would do so
at their peril-not at a risk of having the theme declared inherently
bad, but at a risk of assaulting someone, or, as in the case of children,
creating a degree of risk of harm which is too high to be tolerated.
Hence, legitimate expression could be better protected, the
citizen's right of privacy could be enhanced, and a definite lessening
of the present tensions should occur. Additionally (and this is a
point quite important to priests, ministers, rabbis, and others who
educate and counsel in matters of religion) there hopefully would
be a substantial return from the present unnatural reliance on the
concept of "legal-or-illegal" to concepts of "right-and-wrong."
THE FUTURE
Is there hope that the law may eventually shift over to this
new course? The answer must be guarded, for it is a most difficult
transition to make. But there are signs which give a basis for
cautious optimism.
Roth was the product of widely diverse opinions, and therefore,
did not close the door to later modification. Nor did any of its au-
thors abandon an open mind on the subject-as is amply illustrated
by their decisions in subsequent cases. So, although Roth has sur-
vived, there has been a distinct branching off which now appears to
be leading in the direction of judging the use of the matter instead of
the matter itself, and which, if continued, could form the main
channel of legal thought in the area.
The first big breakthrough came in Ginzburg v. United StateS47
where the Court introduced a new element. It said that matter which
is not obscene, as such, can be rendered obscene if pandered in a
commercial manner.48
Although the prosecution conceded that the publications them-
selves were probably not obscene, the defendant was convicted under
47 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
48 Id. at 467-71, 474-76.
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a federal statute which made it a crime to knowingly use the mails
for the mailing or delivery of any "... obscene, lewd, lascivious,
or filthy book, pamphlet . . . or other publication of an indecent
character .... 1149
Upon reaching the Supreme Court, Ginzburg, the editor of
several publications including a magazine called Eros, found him-
self tripped up by such things as the fact that the magazine bore
the provocative postmarks of two little Pennsylvania hamlets called
"Intercourse" and "Blue Ball." Because of such evidence, the Court
simply held that it was apparent that the intent of the defendant
was solely to minister to the baser passions of the reader.
Justices Black, Douglas, Harlan, and Stewart dissented vigor-
ously,5" but the majority decision was written by Justice Brennan,
the author of Roth, and therefore must be considered as an amplifica-
tion of that earlier decision and not an abandonment of it.
In short, then, the Court said that a course of conduct can be
actionable, even though the basic subject matter involved is not
obscene, and even though no individual element of the conduct is
itself obscene. 51 But, while the ruling was a shock to many who
viewed it as an erosion of the First Amendment, it actually had the
effect of raising the converse question as to whether it might be
possible to utilize "obscene" matter in a nonactionable way.
49 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964).
50 Justices Black and Douglas adhered to their previously expressed beliefs
that government lacks the constitutional power to "put any type of burden on
speech and expressions of ideas of any kind [as distinguished from conduct] . .. .
Ginzburg, at 476. Justice Black further felt that the case's new guidelines were . . . so
vague and meaningless that they practically leave the fate of a person charged
with violating censorship statutes to the unbridled discretion, whim and caprice of
the judge or jury which tries him." Id. at 478.
Justice Douglas added, ". . . a book should stand on its own, irrespective of the
reasons why it was written or the wiles used in selling it." Id. at 482. Further, "I
find it difficult to say that a publication has no 'social importance' because it
caters to the taste of the most unorthodox amongst us. We members of this Court
should be among the last to say what should be orthodox in literature . . . . How-
ever plebian my tastes may be, who am I to say that others' tastes . . . have no
'social importance'?" Id. at 491.
Justice Harlan stated that "[n]ow evidence not only as to conduct, but also
as to attitude and motive, is admissible on the primary question of whether the
material mailed is obscene. I have difficulty seeing how these inquiries are logically
related to the question whether a particular work is obscene." Id. at 497.
Justice Stewart felt it was unfair to convict the defendant of "pandering"
when he was not charged that way, and concluded, ". . . there is even another
aspect of the Court's opinion in this case that is even more regrettable. Today the
Court assumes the power to deny Ralph Ginzburg the protection of the First
Amendment because it disapproves of his 'sordid business'. That is a power the
Court does not possess." Id. at 501.
51 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, at 465-66, 474-76 (1966).
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Then along came Stanley v. Georgia5 2 which held that a person
may possess obscene matter and not be liable therefor until he does
something else with it. Justice Marshall, in delivering the majority
opinion, flatly stated that neither Roth, nor the Court's decisions
subsequent to it, ever involved prosecution for mere possession of
obscene materials, but instead dealt with the power of government
to ". . . prohibit or regulate certain public actions taken or intended
to be taken with respect to obscene matter." 53
Having thus cast a different light upon Roth than was apparent
before, the majority held that the Constitution gives a right to
receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, and
that this right is "fundamental to our free society." 54 Further, the
opinion contained the pervasive statement that "[w]hatever the
power of the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical
to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legislation
on the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts.) 55
Stanley has also been widely claimed to stand for the proposi-
tion that a state may never prohibit mere possession of obscene
matter on the ground it may lead to antisocial conduct, but this
blanket interpretation may be a bit premature. First, the Court
conceded that there is always the danger that obscene material might
fall into the hands of children, or that it might intrude upon the
sensibilities or privacy of the general public. But it found that,
"[n]o such dangers are present in this case."5
Secondly, the Court's precise ruling was that, although the
states have power to regulate obscenity, ". . . that power simply does
not extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his
own home." '57
And lastly, it must be noted that although Justices Brennan
and White concurred in the result, they did so on the basis of unlaw-
ful search and seizure, not on the grounds stated in the majority
opinion. As architects of many of the earlier decisions in the field,
their absence in the majority in this case may carry considerable
significance in projecting the probable results of the many cases
which will seek to amplify the ruling.
The argument is now being made that if there is a constitu-
tional right to "receive," then there must also be a right to dis-
52 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
53 Id. at 561 (emphasis added).
54 Id. at 564
55 Id. at 566.
56 Id. at 567.
57 Id. at 568.
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seminate; and it is here that the battle will be most intense. One
federal trial court has already ruled that if there is a right to possess
obscene material, there is a right to buy it and receive it, and this
means that the federal government cannot constitutionally prosecute
a seller for sending such materials to a consenting adult through
the mails.5
It is a likely extension of Stanley that at least private dissemina-
tion will be held to be protected in most cases, but the line between
public and private dissemination will be most difficult to draw-and
the results of even private transfers as between some individuals
(e.g. from adult to child) could be noxious.
In any event, Stanley takes a giant step toward saying that all
the circumstances of the individual case must be considered, and
that mere classification of matter as obscene or not obscene is only
one factor to be considered in determining whether the course of
conduct is actionable or not.
The opinion also puts heavy stress upon the right of privacy-
at least from the standpoint of "unwanted governmental intrusions
into one's privacy"-but does not quite reach the important question
as to how far government may go in protecting the individual from
intrusions into his privacy by commercial and other private interests.
However, in spite of language which frowns heavily on any govern-
mental action which seems to be aimed at controlling what ideas its
citizens might receive, Stanley does not appear to preclude govern-
mental action which is reasonably designed to give citizens a freedom
of choice as to what ideas they may elect to receive or reject.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, out of all the turmoil and trial and error which we
have had to endure in this difficult area, a pattern of workability
appears to be forming as great legal scholars and practical men
courageously wrestle with the immense problems inherent in the
subject matter. And it is to the great credit of most of them that they
have remained receptive to new ideas and change, and have care-
fully avoided being absolutist in their initial theories.
Because of these attributes, the law on the subject has not
vacillated in recent years, but has built upon itself and gradually
58 United States v. Letha, CRS-884, Memorandum and Order filed April 29,
1970, United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. See also
Karalexis v. Byrne, 360 F. Supp. 1363 (D.C. Mass. 1969). But see Marvin Miller,
Covina Publishing, Inc. v. United States, Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, decision
filed September 16, 1970, (No. 23935) which shows reluctance to extend Stanley.
[V0.1. 1.1
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metamorphosed instead of making disruptively abrupt changes. The
landmark case of Roth, for example, is still valuable, and, in fact,
has gained viability with each succeeding interpretation, even though
it now bears little resemblance to what we originally thought it to be.
As the law progresses in this field, it is apparent that it more
and more squares, not only with the Constitution and with the
natural laws of man, but also with the historical concepts of jurisdic-
tion between ecclesiastical and civil law. The judiciary thus finally
appears to be working on a true course, and it is hoped that legisla-
tors and members of the executive branch of government will follow
suit and not encumber or deter this trend by advocating and enacting
unconstitutional or unworkable laws which run counter to it.
